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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Adam David Bodenbach appeals from his convictions and sentences for first-
degree murder, with a weapons enhancement, and possession of cocaine. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Bodenbach with the first-degree murder of Ryan Harrison Banks, 
with a firearm enhancement, and possession of cocaine.  (R., pp. 75-76.)  Bodenbach filed 
a motion to suppress statements he made in a police interview, claiming that he was under 
the influence of drugs at the time, such that his statements and rights waiver were 
involuntary.  (R., pp. 116-21.)  The district court denied the motion, finding that Bodenbach 
made a voluntary waiver and statement.  (R., pp. 201-14.) 
 The case proceeded to trial.  (R., pp. 254-55, 259-62, 266-69, 304-08, 327-31, 339-
47, 350-58.)  The evidence at trial showed that, after an argument and physical altercation, 
Bodenbach got his gun, went outside Banks’ apartment where Banks was to smoke, and 
fatally shot Banks.  (Tr., p. 722, L. 22 – p. 729, L. 13; p. 950, L. 6 – p. 976, L. 11; p. 1048, 
L. 20 – p. 1107, L. 7; p. 1258, L. 9 – p. 1292, L. 3.)  The evidence of the specific sequence 
of events was contradictory, with eye witness Jacob Kimsey testifying that Bodenbach 
approached with his gun in his hand and pointed at Banks and Kimsey when Banks grabbed 
for the gun and Bodenbach shot him (Tr., p. 1091, L. 18 – p. 1098, L. 5), and Bodenbach 
testifying the gun was in his pocket until Banks attacked him with a knife (Tr., p. 1278, L. 
5 – p. 1286, L. 4). 
In conjunction with self-defense instructions, the district court gave an instruction 
that self-defense does not apply where “the defendant was the initial aggressor to raise the 
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threat or specter of deadly force with the apparent intent to take the life of the said deceased 
or to do him such serious bodily injury as might result in death,” unless he withdrew “from 
further aggressive action” and “communicat[ed] his withdrawal from further aggressive 
action.”  (R., pp. 386-91.)  The jury convicted Bodenbach of first-degree murder, the 
firearm enhancement, and possession of cocaine.  (R., pp. 408-09.)   
The district court imposed concurrent sentences of life with 25 years determinate 
for the enhanced first-degree murder conviction and seven years with three years 
determinate for possession of cocaine.  (R., pp. 445-48.)  Bodenbach filed a timely notice 





 Bodenbach states the issues on appeal as: 
I. 
The District Court’s “first aggressor” instruction, neither initially proposed 
by the State nor found in the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, created 
reversible error under the facts and circumstances of this case. 
 
II. 
The District Court erred in denying Mr. Bodenbach’s motion to suppress 
his in‐custody statements to Detective Pietrzak because the State had failed 
to prove that Mr. Bodenbach knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
waived his Miranda rights. 
 
III. 
The district court abused its discretion in sentencing Mr. Bodenbach to a 
term of life in prison, with 25 years fixed. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 13 (verbatim).) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Bodenbach failed to show fundamental error in the jury instruction that an 
initial aggressor may not claim self-defense unless he ceased his aggression and 
communicated that to the victim? 
 
2. Has Bodenbach failed to show clear error in the district court’s finding that his 
waiver of rights preceding his police interview was knowing and voluntary? 
 
3. Has Bodenbach failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
sentencing him to life with 25 years determinate upon his conviction for first-degree 







Bodenbach Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Jury Instruction That An 
Aggressor May Not Claim Self-Defense Unless He Ceases The Aggression And 




 After the presentation of evidence, the district court requested the parties to address 
whether it should give an instruction regarding application of self-defense where the 
defendant “initiates a violent crime … that results in a fatal shooting.”  (Tr., p. 1214, L. 6 
– p. 1218, L. 1 (internal quotation omitted).)  The district court pointed out that there was 
evidence that Bodenbach pointed a gun at Banks, and that Banks “may have used a knife 
in defense of that.”  (Tr., p. 1219, L. 7 – p. 1220, L. 11.)  The defense provided no input on 
whether to give the instruction.  (Tr., p. 1214, L. 6 – p. 1221, L. 6.) 
 The district court subsequently provided a proposed instruction and invited the 
parties to provide input.  (Tr., p. 1492, Ls. 11-14.)  At this point defense counsel did state 
a general objection to giving the instruction, although he did not object to the language of 
the proposed instruction.  (Tr., p. 1493, Ls. 2-14; p. 1499, L. 9 – p. 1500, L. 17.)  The 
objection, as articulated to the district court, was as follows: 
[Defense Counsel]: I just -- I haven’t -- this law dates back to 1953 or 
something, and I haven’t seen a pattern instruction, I haven’t seen a statute, 
I haven’t seen anything that talks about it. So that’s my objection. 
 
THE COURT: Just the oldness of the cases that do talk about it, the antiquity 
of those? 
 
[Defense Counsel]: Yeah, and that our Supreme Court hasn’t seen fit to gin 
up a pattern instruction that deals with it. I don’t know that they think it’s 




(Tr., p. 1499, L. 21 – p. 1500, L. 6.)  The district court overruled the objection.  (Tr., p. 
1500, L. 20 – p. 1503, L. 11.) 
 On appeal Bodenbach argues the district court erred by instructing the jury that a 
defendant who introduced the threat of deadly force may not claim self-defense.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-20.)  Specifically, he claims the instruction erroneously includes 
a requirement of retreat (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-18), includes language that is “unclear 
and vague” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 18-19), and lessens the state’s burden of proof 
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-20).  Review shows that under Idaho law an initial aggressor may 
not claim self-defense unless he ceased the aggression and communicated that cessation to 
the victim.  Bodenbach has failed to show that giving the instruction was fundamental error.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the appellate 
court exercises free review.  State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 853, 864-65 
(2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 (2000)).  “An 
erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the instructions as a whole 
misled the jury or prejudiced a party.”  State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 
P.3d 582, 600-01 (2010) (citing Kuhn v. Proctor, 141 Idaho 459, 462, 111 P.3d 144, 147 
(2005)).  Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an 
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine.  Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d at 
865; see also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).  To prevail 
under the fundamental error doctrine, Bodenbach must demonstrate that the error he 
alleges: “(1) violates one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists 




including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) 
was not harmless.”  Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
 
C. Bodenbach Has Failed To Claim, Much Less Show, Fundamental Error In The Jury 
Instruction Regarding When Aggressors May Claim Self-Defense 
 
A person claiming self-defense, “if he was the assailant or engaged in mortal 
combat, must really and in good faith have endeavored to decline any further struggle 
before the homicide was committed.”  I.C. § 18-4009(3) (1972).1  Pursuant to this statute, 
a defendant “is not entitled to claim self-defense or justify a homicide when he or she was 
the aggressor or the one who provoked the altercation in which another person is killed, 
unless such person in good faith first withdraws from further aggressive action.”  State v. 
Turner, 136 Idaho 629, 634-35, 38 P.3d 1285, 1290-91 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing State v. 
Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 413-14, 253 P.2d 203, 213-14 (1953), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 486 P.2d 82 (1971)).   
The facts of this case are remarkably similar to the facts in Turner.  In that case, 
after a series of arguments and physical conflicts, Pratt, the victim, was sitting on a couch 
and called Turner a “fucking liar.”  Turner, 136 Idaho at 634, 38 P.3d at 1290.  Turner went 
to the next room, obtained a gun, returned, and pointed the gun at Pratt.  Id.  Pratt then 
made a verbal threat and an aggressive motion, and Turner shot him.  Id.  Under these facts 
“Turner had a good faith obligation to retreat from any confrontation with Pratt before 
resorting to deadly force.”  Id. at 635, 38 P.3d at 1291.  Because “Turner presented no 
                                            
1 The statute was amended in 2018; the subsection was re-numbered but the relevant 
language left unchanged.  2018 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 222, sec. 1, p. 500. 
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reasonable view of the evidence which justified killing Pratt,” he “was not entitled to a 
self-defense instruction.”  Id.  
The primary difference between this case and Turner is that in this case there was 
conflicting evidence regarding when in the sequence of events Bodenbach pointed his gun 
at Banks.  If Bodenbach pointed the gun at Banks before Banks charged him, Bodenbach, 
like Turner, was not entitled to claim self-defense.  Id. at 634-35, 38 P.3d 1285, 1290-91. 
Bodenbach acknowledges that if he was “the assailant or engaged in mortal 
combat,” to assert self-defense under I.C. § 18-4009(3) (1972) he was required to “really 
and in good faith have endeavored to decline any further struggle before the homicide was 
committed,” but argues that the language of the instruction imposed a greater duty than 
that imposed by the statute and thereby may have confused the jury and misstated the law.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-19.)  This argument fails. 
First, this argument was not made to the district court.  Bodenbach did not request 
that the jury be instructed with the statutory language or assert that the language misstated 
applicable law.  (Tr., p. 1493, Ls. 2-14; p. 1499, L. 9 – p. 1500, L. 17.)  Bodenbach’s 
“objection on one ground” did not preserve for appeal the “separate and different basis for 
objection not raised before the trial court” that he asserts on appeal.  State v. Armstrong, 
158 Idaho 364, 367, 347 P.3d 1025, 1028 (Ct. App. 2015).  He therefore has the burden of 
showing fundamental error.  State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 803, 419 P.3d 1042, 1101 (2018) 
(“When a defendant fails to object to a jury instruction, we will review the jury instruction 
for fundamental error.” (internal quotation and ellipses omitted)).  Having failed to claim, 
much less demonstrate, fundamental error, Bodenbach has not met his burden. 
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Second, even if this Court addresses the unraised claim of fundamental error, 
review of the record shows no fundamental error in the instruction.  The statute provides 
that if the person claiming self-defense “was the assailant or engaged in mortal combat,” a 
condition of self-defense is that he “must really and in good faith have endeavored to 
decline any further struggle before the homicide was committed.”  I.C. § 18-4009(3) 
(1972).  The model instruction based on this language provides that a person engaged in 
mutual combat may not assert self-defense “unless and until the person has really and in 
good faith endeavored to decline further combat, and has fairly and clearly informed the 
adversary of a desire for peace and that the person has abandoned the contest.”  I.C.J.I. 
1521.2  Only after the defendant has “endeavored to decline further combat, and has fairly 
and clearly informed the adversary of a desire for peace” will the actions of the victim to 
“continue[] the combat” be considered a “new assault” against which the defendant may 
defend himself.  Id.  The instruction given by the district court, which requires that for self-
defense to apply to an initial aggressor defendant he must “withdraw from further 
aggressive action” and “communicate his withdrawal” (R., p. 391), mirrors the approved 
instruction.    
Bodenbach’s claims of vague language do not show a clear and prejudicial violation 
of his constitutional rights.  See, e.g., State v. Jimenez, 159 Idaho 466, 470-71, 362 P.3d 
541, 545-46 (Ct. App. 2015).  To the contrary, read in its entirety and in the context of the 
rest of the instructions on self-defense, the instruction merely and correctly informed the 
                                            
2 It is unclear why the model instruction speaks only of mutual combat and not of where 
the defendant is the initial aggressor even though both are included in the language of the 
statute.  At a minimum, the same requirements to withdraw from mutual combat would 
apply to abandonment of an initial assault. 
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jury that if Bodenbach pulled his gun first, he could not claim he was defending himself 
even if the victim’s response was to charge him with a knife. 
 
II. 
Bodenbach Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court’s Finding That His 




 The district court denied Bodenbach’s motion to suppress his statements to police, 
which motion was based on the allegation he had taken a large amount of Xanax which 
rendered his rights waiver invalid.  (R., pp. 201-14.)  The district court made extensive 
findings that, during his interview with police, Bodenbach was not impaired but was 
functioning and oriented; expressed himself linearly, clearly and in detail; and showed no 
signs of incapacity.  (R., pp. 202-10.)  The district court concluded Bodenbach “was not 
under the influence of Xanax” as he claimed, and “[e]ven assuming Defendant did ingest 
Xanax or some similar substance, the evidence belies any assertion that he was too 
intoxicated to effectuate a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.”  (R., pp. 
210-14 and n.17.) 
 On appeal Bodenbach argues that “under [the] totality of these circumstances” his 
waiver of rights was not proven knowing and voluntary.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-24.)  
The flaw in his argument is that the “circumstances” he claims on appeal are the factual 
claims specifically rejected by the district court.  Bodenbach’s argument fails because he 





B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The trial court’s conclusion that a defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver 
of his Miranda rights will not be disturbed on appeal where it is supported by substantial 
and competent evidence.”  State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 297, 1 P.3d 795, 798 (2000).  See 
also State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 851-52, 26 P.3d 31, 34-35 (2001); State v. Person, 140 
Idaho 934, 937, 104 P.3d 976, 979 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260, 267, 
47 P.3d 763, 770 (Ct. App. 2001).  ”At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual 
inferences is vested in the trial court.”  Person, 140 Idaho at 937, 104 P.3d at 979.  See 
also State v. Dunn, 134 Idaho 165, 169, 997 P.2d 626, 630 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Nobles, 
122 Idaho 509, 835 P.2d 1320 (Ct. App. 1991).  The appellate court applies all 
presumptions in favor of the trial court’s exercise of that power, and the trial court’s 
findings on such matters will be upheld if they are supported by substantial 
evidence.  Nobles, 122 Idaho at 512, 835 P.2d at 1323. 
 
C. The District Court’s Conclusion Is Supported By Substantial And Competent 
Evidence, And Bodenbach Does Not Claim Otherwise 
 
 “Any waiver of Miranda rights or the underlying constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.”  State v. 
Zamora, 160 Idaho 659, 661, 377 P.3d 1122, 1124 (Ct. App. 2016).  “The State bears the 
burden of demonstrating that an individual has knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
waived his or her rights by a preponderance of the evidence.”  State v. Jensen, 161 Idaho 
243, 251, 385 P.3d 5, 13 (Ct. App. 2016).  The district court engaged in a thorough review 
of the evidence and made factual findings based on that evidence.  (R., pp. 202-10.)  It 
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ultimately made a specific factual finding that Bodenbach “was not under the influence of 
Xanax,” and that his claim otherwise was “contradicted by the totality of the evidence.”  
(R., p. 214 n.17.)  The district court also found that, even assuming Bodenbach was under 
the influence of Xanax or some similar drug, Bodenbach “was still coherent enough to give 
a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.”  (R., p. 214.)   
 Bodenbach claims error under the totality of the circumstances he wishes the 
district court found, while ignoring the circumstances actually found by the district court.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-24.)  He does not claim that the district court’s conclusion that 
he made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights was not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence.  (Id.)  Thus, the district court’s conclusion “will not 
be disturbed on appeal.”  Luke, 134 Idaho at 297, 1 P.3d at 798. 
 
III. 
Bodenbach Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Sentencing Him To Life With 25 Years Determinate Upon His Conviction For First-
Degree Murder With A Firearm Enhancement 
 
A. Introduction 
 The district court imposed a sentence of life with 25 years determinate on 
Bodenbach’s first-degree murder conviction enhanced for use of a firearm.  (R., pp. 445-
48.)  On appeal Bodenbach argues that his sentence is excessive.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 
24-28.)  His argument, however, is based on facts other than, and at times contradictory to, 
those found by the district court.  Because he does not contend the district court’s factual 
findings were clearly erroneous, but instead makes his argument as if they did not matter, 





B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “We review the length of a sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.”  State 
v. Clinton, 155 Idaho 271, 273, 311 P.3d 283, 285 (2013) (internal quotation omitted).  
“Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the appellant bears 
the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.”  State v. Windom, 150 
Idaho 873, 875, 253 P.3d 310, 312 (2011) (internal quotation omitted).  The Court 
considers the defendant’s entire sentence, but presumes that the fixed portion of the 
sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of confinement.  State v. Dabney, 159 Idaho 
790, 367 P.3d 185, 189 (2016). 
“A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to achieve the primary objectives 
of protecting society or the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or 
retribution.”  State v. Struhs, 158 Idaho 262, 267-68, 346 P.3d 279, 284-85 (2015) (internal 
quotation omitted).  “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view 
of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.”  State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 
828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (internal quotation omitted).  “Furthermore, a sentence 
fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse 
of discretion by the trial court.”  State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 
(2016) (internal quotation and brackets omitted). 
“We will defer to factual findings made by the lower court if supported by 
substantial and competent evidence in the record.”  State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 789, 





C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion 
 
 The district court applied the correct legal standard and considered all of the 
materials and arguments presented.  (Tr., p. 1694, Ls. 2-23.)  It found that Bodenbach had 
committed “a senseless, needless killing.”  (Tr., p. 1694, L. 24 – p. 1695, L. 5.)  Bodenbach 
had been “fueled on emotion, drugs, and the culmination of a lifetime spent in that mix, 
that lifestyle, that somehow made it seem okay to carry a loaded pistol across that apartment 
compound with extra bullets in his pocket and killing on his mind.”  (Tr., p. 1695, Ls. 6-
12.)  The district court commented on and considered Bodenbach’s prior violence against 
his mother.  (Tr., p. 1698, Ls. 6-20.)  In addition, Bodenbach showed little, if any, remorse 
for the killing.  (Tr., p. 1702, Ls. 2-20; p. 1703, L. 17 – p. 1704, L. 4.)  The record shows 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion.   
 Bodenbach points out that he “had a normal and relatively happy childhood,” but 
that his “life was derailed” by substance abuse.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 25.)  The district 
court considered these facts.  (Tr., p. 1696, L. 24 – p. 1701, L. 4.)  Bodenbach points to his 
relatively small criminal record.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 26.)  The district court noted 
Bodenbach’s history of violence toward his mother and an incident hitting cars with a 
broom handle.  (Tr., p. 1698, Ls. 6-20; p. 1699, Ls. 8-14.)  Thus, the district court 
considered the matters raised by Bodenbach, but obviously found them more aggravating, 
as opposed to mitigating, than Bodenbach believes them to be. 
 Bodenbach asserts that the district court’s finding that he intended to kill Banks 
when he walked to Banks’ apartment with a gun is “unlikely,” and it is “more likely” that 
he intended to “threaten or frighten Ryan Banks.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 26-27.)  The state 
would dispute what intent was “likely” if this argument were relevant.  Bodenbach does 
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not claim, nor could he show, that the district court’s factual finding was clearly erroneous.  
Thus, what he believes more or less likely is irrelevant under the applicable legal standards. 
 Bodenbach next claims that the district court improperly considered the 
senselessness of his crime to be aggravating instead of mitigating.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 
27.)  Whether a particular fact is aggravating or mitigating is a factual determination, 
reviewed for clear error.  Porter, 130 Idaho at 788-89, 948 P.2d at 143-44.  Again, 
Bodenbach has not even attempted to meet his burden. 
 Finally, Bodenbach asserts he had greater rehabilitation potential than found by the 
district court, and that this rehabilitation potential should have outweighed other sentencing 
concerns.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 27-28.)  This argument amounts to nothing more than a 
request for this Court to improperly substitute its view of a reasonable sentence.  See Miller, 
151 Idaho at 834, 264 P.3d at 941.  Bodenbach has failed to show that the sentence is 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment. 




        /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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